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NOTES
THE IMPACT OF AUTOMOBILE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
LAWS ON OWNERSHIP AND ENCUMBRANCE
The automobile is an expensive, mobile, and common piece of
property. It is relatively easy and very profitable to steal, resulting
in an enormous traffic in stolen automobiles. In order to minimize
these thefts thirty-three states' have enacted certificate of title
laws which have, of necessity, produced great changes in the law
of ownership and encumbrance of motor vehicles. Such a law in
its most complete form provides for central recordation of en-
cumbrances on and changes of title to the automobile with the
record appearing on a single instrument, the certificate of title.
When an automobile is sold the seller's certificate is given to the
purchaser, who sends it to the state agency. The state notes the
change in ownership and issues a new certificate to the purchaser,
resulting in a complete record of changes in title. - This system
has been favorably compared to the Torrens system of land regis-
tration 3 except that it is an administrative official instead of a court
who changes and records title to the motor vehicle.
Certificate of title acts are readily distinguishable from registra-
tion laws in that the latter do not and are not intended to control
title.4 The purpose of registration laws is to aid the state in the
collection of taxes, in apprehending violators of highway regula-
tions and, only incidentally, in the recovery of stolen automobiles.5
An owner's registration card, since it is for tax purposes, must be
renewed annually, whereas a certificate is good until the car is
sold." The only effect of registration on ownership is that the
1. Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Tennessee reportedly
passed a certificate of title law to take effect on July 1, 1951.
2. Although the Minnesota registration law operates similarly, Minn.
Stat. § 168.15 (1949), it is not classed as a title state because its provisions
are for tax purposes, it lacks the elements of anti-theft provisions found in
title states, and it does not call for any central recordation of liens by way
of the "registration certificate."
3. Comment, A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration,
48 Yale L. J. 1238 (1939).
4. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Willey, 237 Iowa 1250, 24 N. W. 2d
796 (1946) ; Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky. 49, 18 S. W. 2d 873 (1929) ; Bolton-
Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N. W. 855 (1937), 22 Minn. L.
Rev. 720 (1938).
5. See Gonchar v. Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, 264, 158 Ati. 545 (1932);
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Willey, sitpra note 4 at 1262, 24 N. W. 2d at
804; Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, supra note 4 at 164, 275 N. W. at 857.
6. See Uniform Vehicle Code, Act I, § 45 (1944).
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registrant is generally considered prima facie the owner,- while
under some certificate of title laws, the certificate is conclusive of
ownership.'
I. OWNERSHIP
In their attempt to control traffic in stolen cars most states
having certificate of title laws make it a misdemeanor to sell or
buy an automobile without transferring the certificate, but do not
expressly render the transaction void.9 Although the courts agree
that the purpose of the certificate acts is to protect the public by
minimizing auomobile thefts,' 0 there is a conflict as to how the
legislatures meant to achieve this result. While the general rule is
that illegal contracts or sales are void and unenforceable,"- a majori-
ty of courts hold that the leislatures intended that the penalty
imposed be exclusive and the transaction effective even though the
certificate is not transferred in compliance with the statute.'12
Other courts, however, in interpreting their statutes, have in
various ways altered the usual incidents of sales law regarding auto-
mobiles if the certificate is not transferred to the purchaser. For
example, in Scarborough v. Detroit Operating Co.," the buyer
was allowed to rescind and recover the purchase price because
the certificate was not delivered. The court, in an earlier decision,24
stated that to hold otherwise would rob the statute of its intent
to protect the public from fraud. Virginia has relied on the same
7. E.g., Shipp v. Davis, 25 Ala. App. 104, 141 So. 366 (1932) ; Flaugh
v. Egan Chevrolet, Inc., 202 Minn. 615, 279 N. NAr. 582 (1938).
8. See note 18 infra.
9. E.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 47-2502(a) (Burns Supp. 1951). "The failure
of the seller to deliver to the purchaser, at the time such vehicle is sold or
delivered, a proper certificate of title .... shall be a misdemeanor." See also
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 23.11 (1941).
10. See Van Houton v. Gizang, 3 N. J. Misc. 233, 234, 127 Ad. 681,
682 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; Al's Auto Sales v. Moskowitz, 203 Okla. 611, 614, 224
P. 2d 588, 591 (1950). See Tex. Stat. Pen. Code art. 1436-1, § 1 (1948)
(legislative intent is to prevent thefts of vehicles and the importation into
this state of stolen automobiles), Reeb v. Danley, 221 S. W. 2d 579, 584
(Tex. Civil App. 1949).
11. Dunlop v. Mercer, 156 Fed. 545, 555 (8th Cir. 1907). See 6 Corbin,
Contracts § 1512 (1951) ; 3 Williston, Sales § 668 (rev. ed. 1948).
12. London Assurance v. Lutfy, 184 F. 2d 40 (9th Cir. 1950) (under
Illinois law, owner has insurable interest although the certificate is not
properly transferred) ; Fogle v. General Credit, Inc., 122 F. 2d 45 (D.C.
Cir. 1941); Commercial Credit CD. v. McNelly, 36 Del. 88, 171 Atl. 446
(1934) ; Wilson v. Mosko, 110 Co",o. 127, 130 P. 2d 927 (1942) ; Al's Auto
Sales v. Moskowitz, 203 Okla. 611, 224 P. 2d 588 (1950). (Colorado has
since passed a new title law which specifically prevents title from passing
unless the certificate is properly transferred, see note 18 infra.)
13. 256 Mich. 173, 239 N. W. 344 (1931).




reasoning in holding that unless the certificate is transferred the
contract remains executory and title does not pass.1" In Majors v.
Majors,0 the Pennsylvania court allowed a judgment creditor of
a husband to levy on the autbmobile which the wife purchased on
the ground that she had the certificate made out to her husband.
It has also been held under this type of statute that unless the
seller transfers the certificate he cannot recover the purchase price.'
7
The legislatures of twelve states have gone further in at-
tempting to regulate the transfer of title to motor vehicles by ex-
pressly preventing title from passing if the certificate is not trans-
ferred when the vehicle is sold.ls There has also been little con-
sistency in the interpretation of these statutes.' In some instances
the courts have stressed the strictness of the title act and have, in
effect, made it conclusive as to ownership. For example, in Loyal's
Auto Exchange, Inc. v. Munch,'0 the seller sold and gave possession
of the car to the purchaser. The seller kept the certificate and sold
it to the plaintiff. In replevin, the plaintiff prevailed over the pur-
chaser, the court stating that the only evidence of a property in-
terest is the certificate. Other courts have held that if the certificate
is not transferred, there can be no action by the seller for the
purchase price ;211 nor can the buyer rescind and recover the pur-
chase price, since the court will not aid the parties or enforce any
rights based on a transfer specifically made illegal and void by
15. Thomas v. Mullins, 153 Va. 383, 149 S. E. 494 (1929); Sauls v.
Thomas Andrews Co., 163 Va. 407, 175 S. E. 760 (1934).
16. 153 Pa. Super. 175, 33 A. 2d 442 (1943). Contra: Henry v. General
Forming, Ltd., 33 Cal. 2d 223, 200 P. 2d 785 (1948). Note that the California
statute, note 18 infra, prevents any transfer of interest unless the certificate
is transferred; whereas the Pennsylvania court had to read this into their
statute, and yet the respective courts reached opposite results.
17. Van Houton v. Gizang, 3 N. J. Misc. 233, 127 Atl. 681 (Sup. Ct.
1925) ; Stonebraker v. Zullinger, 139 Pa. Super. 134, 11 A. 2d 698 (1940).
Although the Pennsylvania statute calls only for a monetary penalty in case
of noncompliance, another provision states that no person shall otn a vehicle
unless a certificate has been obtained pursuant to the act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
75, §§ 31, 37 (Supp. 1950), and the court relied heavily on the latter provision
in the Stonebraker case.
18. Cal. Vehicle Code § 186 (1943) ; Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 16, § 13(8)
(Supp. 1950) ; Fla. Stat. § 319.22(1) (1949); Idaho Code Ann. § 49-404
(1948) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-135( ) (6) (1949) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 8382(c) (1943) ; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 53-109(d) (1947) ; Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 60-105 (1943) ; Ohio Code Ann. § 6290-4 (1948) ; Tex. Stat. Pen.
Code art. 1436, § 33 (1948) ; Utah Code Ann. § 57-3a-72 (1943).
19. See Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 51, 89 P. 2d 235, 239 (1939)
(dissenting opinion, which reviews the cases in this field and points out
how circumstances alter the decisions).
20. 45 N. W. 2d 913 (Neb. 1951) (two dissents on the basis of un-
constitutionality), 30 Neb. L. Rev. 656.
21. Ludwig v. Steger, 99 Cal. App. 235, 278 Pac. 494 (3d Dist. 1929);
Hento v. Melmer, 44 N. W. 2d 212 (S.D. 1950).
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the legislature.2 2 Moreover, the seller has been held liable for the
buyer's negligence in the operation of the car,23 and the buyer has
been held to be without an insurable interest.2 4
The above cases show that in some instances the courts strictly
apply the certificate acts with the loss usually falling on the pur-
chaser. On the other hand, many courts, interpreting similar stat-
utes, strain to reach an equitable result by bestowing ownership on
the purchaser. The Utah law:22 states that no delivery or transfer
shall be effective for any purpose unless the certificate passes with
the automobile. Yet, the court allowed a plaintiff to recover an
automobile from her husband's estate on her claim that the hus-
band gave it to her as a gift although the certificate was never
transferred.2 6 In Cerex v. Peterson,27 the court held that an Iowa
statute which prevented title from passing unless the registration
card was transferred did not affect the transfer of title between the
parties since only the state could take advantage of the provision.
Although the Missouri courts have emphasized that a similar act
must be strictly construed regardless of the equities, 2 8 they have
allowed replevin to a plaintiff who did not have a valid certificate, 2
and in Dee v. Sutter"0 went so far as to state that the certificate is
only prima facie evidence of title.
The Ohio law, 31 which is an example of the most stringent
certificate act, states that no court shall recognize any claim or
interest to an automobile unless evidenced by a certificate, nor
shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of a purchaser as
against one holding a valid certificate. Yet, the holder of a valid
22. Reeb v. Danley, 221 S. W. 2d 579 (Tex. Civil App. 1949), 2 Baylor
L. Rev. 97 (reviews the inconsistent holdings of the court under their
certificate law).
23. Bunch v. Kin, 2 Cal. App. 2d 81, 37 P. 2d 744 (3d Dist. 1934);
Endres v. Mara-Rickenbacker, 243 Mich. 5, 219 N. W. 719 (1928).
24. Noorthoek v. Preferred Automobile Ins. Co., 292 Mich. 561, 291
N. W. 6 (1940); Evens v. Home Ins. Co., 231 Mo. App. 932, 82 S. W. 2d
111 (1935) ; cf. Morris v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 121 Kan. 482, 247 Pac. 852
(1926).
25. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3a--72 (1943).
26. Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235 (1939).
27. 203 Iowa 355, 212 N. V. 890 (1927). This statute was subse-
quently repealed, but instead of passing a more stringent statute, the legis-
lature passed the present act which calls for only a monetary penalty. See
Iowa Code Ann. § 321.67 (1939).
28. See Weaver v. Lake, 4 S. W. 2d 834, 835 (Mo. App. 1928).
29. Pearl v. Interstate Securities Co., 357 .Mo. 160, 206 S. W. 2d 975
(1947) ; cf. Peper v. American Exchange National Bank, 205 S. W. 2d
215 (Mo. App. 1947), rev'd and remnajzded, 357 Mo. 652, 210 S. W. 2d 41
(1948).
30. 222 S. W. 2d 541 (Mo. App. 1949), 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1221 (1950).
31. Ohio Code Ann. § 6290-4 (1948).
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certificate was denied replevin against a subsequent purchaser who
was given a fraudulent certificate, -3 2 the court stating that the
purchaser had actual ownership with possession and control. Some
courts, however, would allow the seller to bring replevin against the
buyer where the seller has retained the certificate pending payment
if the purchase price,^ apparently on the basis that if there is
nothing inherently immoral about the illegal act, the court will not
leave the parties where they find them. 4
Certificate of title acts which void the sale, and those judicial
interpretations which reach the same result, have radically altered
the law of sales,"' in that the passing of title no longer depends
on the intention of the parties. This, coupled with the obvious
disadvantage of a layman's relying on the automobile dealer as to
the legality of the transaction, is probably responsible for the in-
consistent and sometimes inequitable results reached by the courts.
The Minnesota court has noted the serious consequences of making
the certificate "conclusive" as to ownership.3 Furthermore, it is
extremely doubtful whether statutes voiding the sale are any more
effective in accomplishing the objective of minimizing car thefts
than a law relying only on a monetary penalty.37 This penalty,
coupled with the fact that the certificate is used as a basis for lien
recordation, should just as often cause the purchaser to insist on
receiving the certificate as if the law voided the sale. The latter type
of statute seems unnecessary as well as impractical.
II. ENCUMBRANCES
Originally, liens-" on motor vehicles were recorded locally,
somewhat in the same manner as liens on land. But these two types
of liens are antithetical. Land is stationary, the automobile is made
32. Yarwood v. De Lage, 91 N. E. 2d 272 (Ohio App. 1949).
33. Hoshaw v. Fenton, 232 Mo. App. 137, 11 S. W. 2d 1140 (1937)
see Ludwig v. Steger, 99 Cal. App. 235, 238, 278 Pac. 494, 495 (3d Dist.
1929).
34. Ludwig v. Steger, supra note 33.
35. See Uniform Sales Act § 18.
36. See Amick v. Exchange State Bank, 164 Minn. 136, 137, 204 N. W.
639, 640 (1925).
37. The National Automobile Theft Bureau states that there is no
doubt that a certificate of title law reduces car thefts. Communication from
National Automobile Theft Bureau, on file, University of Minnesota Law
Library. However, there are no statistics showing which certificate law, if
either, reduces thefts the most. The Uniform Vehicle Code has never advo-
vated that a transfer of ownership be ineffective if the certificate is not
passed, but rather provides for monetary penalty in case of noncompliance.
Uniform Vehicle Code, Act 1, §§ 52, 53, 99 (1944).
38. The term "lien" here refers to liens and encumbrances such as
conditional sales, conditional leases, chattel mortgages, etc., except those
liens and encumbrances dependent on possession.
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to travel-one is indestructible, the other has a life span of only
years and may change owners a dozen times within that period. To
attempt local recording on this unique property is sheer folly.
To make a search for a lien on an automobile in Minnesota (a
non-title state) would necessitate a search in every county and
first class city in the state.3 " This means that there is no practical
way of knowing whether a motor vehicle is encumbered. When
one considers that there is more automobile installment sale credit
outstanding than all other such consumer credit combined 4 it is
apparent that this is a matter of utmost concern to commercial
interests and purchasers.4 1
Under the hodgepodge of local recording in non-title states
the finance companies, who assume the large majority of liens from
the dealer who sells the car, often do not consider it worthwhile
to record their liens.42 Besides the time and expense, there is the
danger of recording in the wrong locality.43 Furthermore, many
courts protect the purchaser if the sale was made by a dealer in
the usual course of business," apparently recognizing that it is
highly impractical for a prospective purchaser to wade through
recording books when buying consumer goods. 45 Consequently,
a reserve fund must be created to protect against loss of the
security resulting in higher interest rates to the security debtor.
Other courts, however, strictly construe their local recording
statutes to permit the lienor to recover the car from the purchaser
even though the latter bought from a dealer in the usual course of
39. Minn. Stat. §§ 511.01, 511.04, 511.18, 511.20, 511.26 (1949).
40. 37 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1190 (Sept. 1951) (figures as of July 1951).
41. It is noteworthy that in other forms of transportation, as rail and
air, there has been central recording of ownership for some time. The federal
government records liens on airplames, 52 Stat. 1006 (1938), as amended,
49 U. S. C. § 523 (1946), and state laws call for central recording of rail-
road stock, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 222.17, 222.18 (1949) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 114,
§ 50 (Supp. 1950).
42. Consultation with a large finance company revealed that under
usual conditions they do not file in Minnesota unless the balance is over
two thousand dollars. Another company stated that if the purchaser is
"sub-standard" they will file if the balance is over five hundred dollars.
43. See Miller Motor Co. v. Jaax, 193 Minn. 85, 257 N. W. 653 (1934);
Snyder Automotive Inc. v. Boyle, 162 Minn. 261, 202 N. W. 481 (1925).
44. Moore v. Ellison, 82 Colo. 478, 261 Pac. 461 (1927) ; Al's Auto
Sales v. Moskowitz, 203 Okla. 611, 224 P. 2d 588 (1950); cf. Flynn v.
Colonial Discount Co., 149 Misc. 607, 269 N. Y. Supp. 394 (N.Y. City Ct.
1933). See 2 U. L. A., Conditional Sales Act § 9 (1922) ; Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 9-307 (1950 draft) ; 23 Minn. L. Rev. 846 (1939).
45. See Flynn v. Colonial Discount Co., supra note 44 at 610, 269 N. Y.
Supp. at 397; Boice v. Finance and Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 570, 102
S. E. 591, 593 (1920) (the court emphasized the unreasonableness and




trade." Then the only recourse is against the seller (too often
only a theoretical advantage) even though the purchaser may
have searched in vain through many of the local record books only
to miss the one that contained the lien.
4 7
Since a certificate of title is based on central recording of owner-
ship it is obvious that the certificate could also be used as a record-
ing device for encumbrances by having a copy of the lien agree-
ment and the certificate mailed to the motor vehicle department
where the lien is recorded, noted on the certificate, and returned to
the lienor or the debtor. To various degrees, all the states having
certificate laws have incorporated this plan into their act. Unfor-
tunately, in the majority of cases this has resulted in making a
deplorable situation worse. While under local recording there is
the recognized possibility of "hidden" security interests, under
some centralized recording systems, one may be lulled into a sense
of security by the "diploma" of ownership embodied in the certifi-
cate, only to find that the real evidence of ownership is still hidden
in the various counties of the state. However, as will be seen,
this condition need not and does not exist in a few states that have
made the certificate a positive recording device.
Statutes using the certificate for the recordation of liens may
be placed in three classifications. The first are those states that
require liens to be centrally recorded and noted on the certificate
only when application is made for a certificate, i.e., whenever an
automobile is transferred to a new owner.4 8 The second group
requires all liens to be recorded and noted on the certificate, whether
the lien attaches when the car is sold or in the hands of the present
owner."' However, in neither of these groups is recordation con-
46. E.g.. General Credit Corp. v. Rohde, 122 Conn. 100, 187 Atl. 676
(1936) ; Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C. 154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928). For an
extended treatment of how finance companies seek to protect their interest,
see Note, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 605 (1944).
47. For an example of the purchaser's predicament under local record-
ing, see Merchants Rating & Adjustment Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash. 2d 46, 102
P. 2d 227 (1940).
48. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-111 (1947); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 95'/, § 77
(Supp. 1950); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 47-2501 (Burns Supp. 1951); Kan. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 8-135(c) (1) and (2) (1949) ; Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art.
66 , § 22 (Ctun. Supp. 1947); N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:10-8, 39:10-11
(Supp. 1950) ; N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-52(a) (3) (1943) ; N. D. Rev.
Code 39-0505(3) (1943); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 23.3 (1941); S. D.
Code § 44.0202 (1939) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 1517 (1949) ; Wis. Stat. § 85.01
(3) (1949).
49. Mich. Stats. Ann. §§ 9.1917, 9.1938 (Supp. 1949); Nev. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 4435.14(a) (Supp. 1949) (chattel mortgages only); Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 68-203 (Supp. 1943), 115-114 (Supp. 1947); Wash.
Rev. Stat. §§ 6312-3, 6312-7 (Rem. Supp. 1947); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann.
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structive notice,50 and consequently the lienor must still record
locally to protect himself. A third group of states completely elim-
inates local recording by having all liens recorded centrally and
noted on the certificate, such filing being constructive notice.51
The first two groups present a situation precarious to all parties.
A lienor is not likely to waste time and money recording on a
certificate that does not constitute constructive notice even though
a monetary penalty is involved, but will record locally if he records
at all. This allows the one in possession of the vehicle to exhibit to a
prospective purchaser a clear certificate, resulting in possible loss to
one of the parties.5 2 Notwithstanding the fact that the certificate is
not constructive notice, the lienor, although he records locally, may
find that he is not protected against the purchaser unless he takes
all the steps allowed in protecting himself under the certificate of
title act.52 Consequently, the lienor is often burdened by a double
recording system and the purchaser may still have to hunt through
the local records.5 1 Nothing is accomplished by this except de-
ception and some states in these first two groups carry this to its
extreme by stating directly on the certificate that all liens from the
records of the motor vehicle department are noted on the certifi-
cate.5" Others, however, carefully point out that they do not record
§§ 60-204, 60-208(f) (Supp. 1951). Washington, Nevada, and Oregon appear
to allow subsequent recording on the certificate only as to chattel mortgages,
and the latter two states make suc:h recording constructive notice.
50. Carolina Discount Corr. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 129
S. E. 414 (1925) ; cf. Security National Bank v. Bell, 125 N. J. L. 640, 17
A. 2d 552 (Ct Err. & App. 1941).
51. Ariz. Code Ann. § 66-231 (1939) ; Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 195, 196,
198 (1948) ; Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 16, § 13(18) (Supp. 1950); Del. Rev.
Code § 5574 (1935) ; Fla. Stat. §§ 319.15, 319.27 (1949) ; Idaho Code Ann.
§49-412 (Supp. 1951) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §8 3488, 3515 (1942) (purchase
money chattel mortgages are exempted); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 53-110
(1947) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-110 (1943); N. M. Stat. §§ 68-115 (Supp.
1951), 68-119 (1941) ; Ohio Code Ann. § 6290-9 (1948) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
75, § 33, tit. 21, § 940.5 (Supp. 1950) ; Tex. Stat. Pen. Code art. 1436, §§ 41-
44 (1948) ; Utah Code Ann. § 57-3a-80 (1943).
52. ". . . in a majority of States chattel mortgages and other liens
against motor vehicles are reccrded locally, and the owner may or may
not admit the existence of such liens in his application for certificate of
title, although required to do so by State law .... This is one of the most
serious deficiencies in the certificate of title ... laws .... The President's
Highway Safety Conference, Report of Committee on Laws and Ordinances
41 (1949).
53. Nichols v. Bogda Motors, Inc., 118 Ind. App. 156, 77 N. E. 2d
905 (1948) ; Sorensen v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101 P. 2d 928 (1940).
But cf. Community State Bank v. Crissinger, 89 N. E. 2d 78 (Ind. App.
1949).
54. For a good treatment of the numerous recording problems created
in one state by this type of statute, see Note, 25 Ind. L. J. 337 (1950).
55. E.g., Illinois, Kansas, North Dakota, North Carolina, South Dakota.
For illustrations of certificates of title in these states see Peck's Title Book
(Stephens-Peck, Inc., rev. ed. 1950).
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nor guarantee the existence of liens. 8 A few states in the first two
groups mail the encumbered certificate to the lienor.5 7 This has
some virtue in that a prospective purchaser is put on guard by
the absence of the seller's certificate. However, it has been held
that even though the certificate is in possession of the lienholder,
the purchaser may be protected if the sale is made in the usual
course of business. 8
The third group of states has recognized and answered the
problem of the migratory automobile by using the certificate
of title as a positive recording device. Under this system a pur-
chaser may reasonably rely on the certificate, which "travels"
with the car and its owner, rather than searching through volumi-
nous record books under local recording in a county which the
two may have ceased to inhabit or where the fraudulent seller falsely
registered.
It has been held that recording by means of the certificate,
when it is used as a positive recording device, protects the lien-
holder even though the purchaser buys from a dealer in the usual
course of business, 9 thus denying to the purchaser the protection
normally afforded him.60 In defense of this result, it can be argued
that the purchaser has an expedient means of ascertaining whether
the vehicle is encumbered by merely insisting that the seller pro-
duce the certificate. It should be noted that failure to record the
lien on the certificate has no effect on validity of the lien as be-
.ween the parties01
l'Most recording systems have defects and centralized recording
by means of the certificate is no exception. The purchaser is
56. E.g., Maryland, West Virginia. See Peck's Title Book, supra
note 55.
57. E.g., N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-57(f) (1943); N. D. Rev. Code
§ 39-0505 (1943); Wash. Rev. Stat. § 6312-4(d) (Rem. Supp. 1947). In
Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash. 2d 46, 102 P. 2d
227 (1940), P filed his mortgage locally but allowed the mortgagor to keep
the clear certificate. The mortgagor sold the car and the court held for the
purchaser because the fraud was made possible by P's omission in not taking
up the certificate.
58. L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N. E. 2d 129(1940) ; cf. Fogle v. General Credit, Inc., 122 F. 2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1941)(chattel mortgage).
59. Crawford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N. E. 2d
306 (1939); cf. Nelson v. Fisch, 241 Iowa 1, 39 N. W. 2d 594 (1949).
See Colonial Finance Co. v. Hunt, 290 Ky. 299, 304, 160 S. W. 2d 591, 594(1942).
60. See note 44 supra.
61. Janney v. Bell, 111 F. 2d 103 (4th Cir. 1940) (the court, in con-
struing the Virginia act, rejected the argument that because of the ease in
which vehicles may be transported and sold, central recording is more than
the usual recordation scheme) ; Clynch v. Bowers, 164 S. 1V. 2d 768 (Tex.
Civil App. 1942).
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burdened with the added expense of obtaining the certificate'"
besides the registration card, which in some states, as Minnesota,
is free. Coupled with this increased expense is the fact that the
direct, primary beneficiaries of such a law are the automobile
finance companies, banks, and car dealers. This, however, should
not be considered a shortcoming of the certificate of title law
for there are numerous reasons why the commercial interests and
the buying public have a duplicity of interest in a workable record-
ing system.
A more valid objection is the possibility of fraud through the
use of a duplicate certificate. The fraud works in this way: A buys
a car free of liens and receives a clear certificate. He then pretends
to have lost that certificate and is given another, plainly marked
"duplicate." A mortgages the car, giving the mortgagee the dupli-
cate which is sent to the state, filed, and returned. Subsequently,
A sells the car, presenting the original, clear certificate to the un-
suspecting purchaser. This practice, however, should be a rarity
for A has no way of knowing whether the purchaser will check
with the state, where the lien is of record.63
If it be agreed that these imperfections of centralized recording
are slight compared to the advantages gained, then why is the
system spreading as slowly as it is? In defense of the legislatures
it may be said that the usual proponents of enlightened lawmaking,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Law, did not lead the way. That group, in cooperation with the
National Conference on Street and Highway Safety,6' drafted a
Uniform Vehicle Code in 1926 which provided, in essence, for
recordation in the same manner as the first group of states pre-
viously mentioned,65 that is, liens to be noted only on application
62. This added expense may be offset by two factors: 1) Theft insur-
ance premiums may be reduced (communication from the National Auto-
mobile Theft Bureau, on file, University of Minnesota Law Library);
2) finance companies' losses in their security interest may be reduced, re-
sulting in lower interest rates.
63. This assumes that the title law calls for the lien to be centrally
recorded as well as noted on the certificate. The Uniform Vehicle Code,
Act 1, §§ 64, 65 (1944) and mos-: states so provide. Virginia, however. calls
for the lien to be noted only on the certificate. Va. Code Ann. § 46-70 (1950).
This should be avoided for it makes the duplicate certificate of title racket
almost foolproof.
64. This group was dissolved in 1946 and is now a part of the Presi-
dent's Highway Safety Conference. Communication from C. W. Stark, sec-
retary, National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, on
file, University of Minnesota Law Library.
65. See note 48 supra.
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for a certificate. ° Fortunately, the Code was declared obsolete in
1943.Y7 However, the National Conference on Street and Highway
Safety thoroughly revised the Code in 1944 and it now provides
for the certificate to be used as a basis for positive recording of
liens. 5
One political hindrance towards centralized recording may be
the loss in revenue to the counties caused by the elimination of
local recording. But the administrative work at the local level
need not necessarily be extinguished inasmuch as a few states use
the facilities of both county and state agencies in recording the
lien on the certificate.6'9 This has the disadvantage of duplication
in administrative work but the advantage of being convenient and
expedient since constructive notice arises when the lien is noted
on the certificate by the county.70
III. INTERSTATE TRANSACTIONS
Suppose X has a lien on his automobile in state A. He "skips"
with the car into state B with the intention of selling the car to a
dealer in state B. If .4 is a non-title state, all X need show is his
registration card and a bill of sale. The latter, of course, will show
only liens retained by X's seller, or, as is often done, X shows a
faked bill of sale. If state A is in group one or two previously
mentioned 7' the dealer in state B may mistakenly rely on the cer-
tificate to show all the outstanding liens.7 " After buying the car,
the dealer will register it locally and then sell to a purchaser who
6. 11 U. L. A., Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act §§ 4, 5 (1930).
67. Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws 69 (1943). The Conference, however, has since re-endorsed
the Code and is participating in its further development. Communication
from'C. W. Stark, see note 64 supra.
68. Uniform Vehicle Code, Act 1, § 64 (1944). The Uniform Commer-
cial Code, Art. 7, Part 8 (1949 draft), also had a complete centralized
recording system for automobiles prepared by the reporter, but these pro-
visions were omitted in the 1950 draft, which leaves motor vehicles to be
recorded locally unless the state has a certificate of title system. Uniform
Commercial Code § 9-401(1) (b) (1950 draft).
69. Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 16, § 13(19) (Supp. 1950); Mo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 3488 (1949) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-110 (1943) ; Ohio Code Ann. §
6290-9 (1948).
70. E.g., Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 16, § 13(25) (Supp. 1950); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 60-110 (1943).
71. See notes 48 and 49 supra.
72. Cf. Rice Street Motors v. Smith, 167 Pa. Super. 159, 74 A. 2d 535(1950). P sold to X by conditional sale in Minnesota which is a non-title
state with local recordation. However, on the registration card appears the
meaningless words, "This is also Minnesota Title." X, without P's knowl-
edge, sold the car in Pennsylvania and P seeks to repossess. The court held
for the purchaser, stating that the latter was justified in relying on the
possession of X and the Minnesota "certificate" which showed no liens. Cf.
Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 99 N. E. 2d 665 (Ohio 1951).
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has no knowledge of the out--of-state origin of the car. The lienor
now discovers the car and seeks to recover. At first glance, the
conflict of laws rule that the law of the place where the lien was
created governs might appear to settle the issue, 3 especially in
light of the near disintegration of the minority rule,7 4 culminating
in Bank of Atlanta v. Fret.' There has, however, been a general
trend in the legislatures towards protection of the local purchaser.--
Florida, for example, refuses to recognize foreign liens on auto-
mobiles unless they are also recorded in Florida.7 7New Mexico
has sought a unique remedy by recognizing foreign liens on auto-
mobiles only if the state of origin uses the certificate as a positive
recording device.78 Although this approach has been criticized,"
there is much in its favor. If New Mexico owners must pay for
a certificate resulting in protection to buyers in other states, why
should New Mexico buyers of out-of-state cars from non-title states
suffer from the possibility of having their cars repossessed?
The best protection that a state can give its citizens against
thieves and skip operators is to require as a condition to registra-
tion that a title search be made in the state of origin unless the
certificate in the latter state is a positive recording device.80 A few
states have incorporated substantially this plan into their certifi-
cate of title acts.8 '
As long as some states abstain from using the certificate as a
positive recording device it can be expected that other states will
legislate to protect their local purchasers from out-of-state liens.
73. Hinton v. Bond Discount Co., 214 Ark. 718, 218 S. W. 2d 75
(1949) ; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws §§ 157, 158 (3d ed. 1949) ; Restatement,
Conflict of Laws § 268(1) (1934).
74. General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 209, 196 So. 323(1940) ; Metro-Plan, Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner, Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296
N. W. 304 (1941) ; Bankers' Finance Corp. v. Locke & Massey Motor Co.,
170 Tenn. 28, 91 S. W. 2d 297 (1936).
75. 226 S. W. 2d 843 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1950). Contra: Rice Street Motors
v. Smith, 167 Pa. Super. 159, 7L- A. 2d 535 (1950).
76. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 73 at 481. For a complete analysis of
interstate automobile lien transactions, see Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien
Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 Pa. L. Rev. 455 (1948).
77. Fla. Stat. § 319.15, Inman v. Rowsey, 41 S. 2d 655 (Fla. 1949),
3 U. of Fla. L. Rev. 117 (1950).
78. N. M. Stat. Ann. § 68-104 (Supp. 1951). Also see Colo. Stat. Ann.
c. 16, § 13(31) (Supp. 1950) which states that foreign liens will be recog-
nized only if stated on the certificate.
79. Leary, supra note 76, at 467.
80. The Uniform Vehicle Code has never called for a lien search, but
Act 1, § 35(4) (1944) gives the motor vehicle department authority to re-
quire any additional information which will enable it to determine whether
the vehicle is entitled to registration.




Although the trend is towards elimination of recording in in-
dividual consumer goods,S2 the automobile presents a formidable
exception because of its relatively high value. If automobile liens
are worth recording, then local recording, such as used in Minne-
sota, should be abolished for it affords little protection to the
lienor and is a trap for the unwary purchasers 3 If commercial in-
terests are to continue making installment sales and loans on motor
vehicles at comparatively low interest rates they should be in a
position to protect their interest. This means that a purchaser
must have a simple and certain means of acquiring knowledge of
that interest. At present, the certificate of title is the only practical
way of acquiring this knowledge. However, the provisions in many
states which void the transfer of title if the certificate is not passed
with the car are not necessary for the protection of either party.
Their only purpose is to urge the passing of the certificate and
this can be accomplished just as readily by making the certificate
a positive recording device and substituting a monetary penalty
for noncompliance.
82. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-303(c) and comment (1950 draft).
83. See Snyder Automotive Inc. v. Boyle, 162 Minn. 261, 263, 202
N. W. 481, 482 (1925). The court, in considering whether an automotive lien
was recorded properly, said, "It is sometimes difficult to determine the legal
situs of personal property at a given moment. But possible difficulties furnish
no reason why we should not give effect to the obvious legislative purpose. ...
It is for lienors and counsel to meet the situation as best they may."
